# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract: lv  
Preface: X  
Acknowledgement: XII  
Declaration: XIV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.NO.</th>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1 New Russia Emerges</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Loving the past... from safe distance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 New leader for a new Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4 Yeltsin's legacy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5 Controversial legacy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6 Mr. Putin</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.7 From spy to Kremlin golden boy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.8 The Chechen crackdown</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.9 Superpower ambitions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.10 Democracy bargained away?</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.11 The Third President –Dmitry Medvedev</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.12 Putin's Russia...according to Dmitry Medvedev</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.13 Chapterization</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.14 Aims and objectives</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.15 Research questions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.16 Hypothesis</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RUSSIA’S SECURITY INTEREST IN CENTRAL ASIA</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1 The Political Return of Russia in Central Asia</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Regional Reorganization: The Multilateral Reinforcement of Central</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Asia-Russia Links
2.2.1 Bilateral and Multilateral Military Cooperation
2.2.2 Arms proliferation and Growth of Islamic Fundamentalism
2.2.3 Threat from the growth of Narcotics Trade in the Region
2.2.4 Ethnic and National Conflicts in Central Asia
2.2.5 The CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization
2.2.6 The Eurasian Economic Community
2.2.7 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
2.3 An Essential Economic Force: Russia's Control over the Resources of Central Asia
2.3.1 The Diaspora Issue
2.4 The Migration Issue

3 THE NEW GREAT GAME AND ITS IMPACT ON CENTRAL ASIA
3.1 Politics of Energy Resources of Central Asia
3.2 Politics of Pipelines
3.3 Russia's Role in the New Great Game
3.4 Aftermath of 11 September: Russian Retreat from Eurasianism
3.5 American Interests in Central Asia
3.6 Main Trends
3.7 China's Emerging Ties with Central Asia
3.8 Securing Chinese Central Asia: Xinjiang
3.9 Creating a Friendly Central Asian Buffer
3.10 Oil and Gas in China's Strategy
3.11 China's Strategic Initiatives
3.12 Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO)
3.13 India and Central Asia: Towards a Co-operative Future
3.14 India's Engagement with Central Asia
3.15 Economic Cooperation between India & Central Asia
3.16 Challenges of Terrorism and Political Stability between India and Central Asia Relations
3.17 Iran and Central Asia: Regional Multilateral Cooperation
3.18 Iran's Bilateral Relations with Central Asian Republics
| 3.19 | Iranian ‘Nuclearisation’ and Central Asia | 95 |
| 3.20 | Iran and the US Military Presence in Central Asia | 96 |
| 3.21 | Iran and the Caspian Oil Transportation | 97 |
| 3.22 | Iran and the North-South Transport Corridor | 98 |
| 3.23 | Islamic World and Central Asia: Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan | 99 |
| 3.24 | Turkey and Central Asia | 101 |
| 3.25 | Pakistan and Afghanistan | 103 |

4

| 4.1 | YELTSIN’S POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA |
| 4.2 | Shaping Russian Foreign Policy |
| 4.3 | The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation |
| 4.4 | CIS Meetings held during Yeltsins Presidency 1991-1996 |
| 4.5 | The Strategic Situation and the Russian Response |
| 4.5.1 | The Security Situation in Central Asia and the Russian Response |
| 4.5.2 | Tajikistan |
| 4.5.3 | Uzbekistan |
| 4.5.4 | Afghanistan |
| 4.6 | An Evolving Anti-Extremist Agenda |
| 4.7 | Conclusion |

5

| 5.1 | PUTIN’S POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA |
| 5.3 | A New Policy in the Making |
| 5.4 | New Attention to the Economic Sector |
| 5.5 | Russia and Central Asia Bilateral Relations Under Putin’s Presidency 2000-2004 |
| 5.5.1 | Kyrgyzstan |
| 5.5.2 | Turkmenistan |
| 5.5.3 | Tajikistan |
| 5.5.4 | Uzbekistan |
| 5.6 | Conclusion |
| 5.6.1 | Russia’s policy in Central Asia under Putin’s Presidency 2004-2008 |
| 5.6.1.1 | Institutional cooperation |
MEDVEDEV'S POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA

6.1 New Russian world order: the five principles
6.2 The implications
6.3 Russia's military reform plan falters
6.4 Big Debut
6.5 'Good Cop, Bad Cop'
6.5.1 Western Perceptions
6.6 Russia and Kazakhstan Relations during Medvedev's Presidency
6.7 Central Asia: Medvedev Visit Underscores Kazakh Victory Over Uzbekistan For Regional Dominance
6.8 Balancing Relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
6.9 Picture of Stability (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan)
6.10 Is Russia Forging a New CIS Strategy under Medvedev's Presidency?
Political and Security compulsions as well as energy, trade, transit and commercial gains mainly determine Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia since 1991. Pakistan always sustained hope to become a regional transit trade hub by linking Central Asia, Western China and South Asia. Access to Central Asia’s energy resources is one of the main objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards the region. Economic Cooperation Organisation and Gwadar Port are still valid hopes of Pakistan in this regard. Pakistan actively engaged in Afghanistan for having a stable pro-Pakistan regime there and resultantly e