Flows and Ebbs: Assessing Women’s Representation in Canada through the Lens of Leadership Campaigns

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Writing in 1967, Hanna Pitkin set forth the categories of representational thinking that have long shaped women and politics research. Her distinction between “standing for” or descriptive versus “acting for” or substantive representation was adopted by subsequent generations of scholars who probed in particular the conversion from numbers of women participants to the tenor and content of policy debate.¹

Much of the comparative literature in this area assessed the ability of female politicians to alter institutional norms and public agendas at a given time and place. In the United States, for example, Janet Flammang’s study of local activists in Santa Clara County, California; Cindy Simon Rosenthal’s work on state committee leadership in Colorado, Ohio and Oklahoma; Beth Reingold’s research on Arizona and California legislators; and Debra Dodson’s book on the 103rd and 104th sessions of Congress analyzed specific deliberative bodies in defined periods.² Sarah Childs’ study of British Labour MPs and Lisa Young’s work on cross-party cooperation among Canadian MPs were similarly focused on identifiable institutional and chronological contexts.³
Briefly stated, these studies concluded women can “make a difference” in their contributions to legislative activity. Female politicians, however, vary considerably in their orientations toward organized feminism, commitments to collective action on movement claims, and willingness to challenge prevailing political norms and structures. In those cases where elected women have employed their numerical presence toward substantive ends, this conversion has generally involved one or both of the following factors: first, strong women’s movement pressure from outside the legislative setting and second, the presence of a pre-recruitment history of feminist engagement among women holding public office.

Reingold (2000) and Dodson (2006) offered strong evidence that the conversion from numerical to substantive representation was far from automatic; in fact, their studies indicated it may be stymied or blocked by the election of growing numbers of conservative women legislators. Published findings on the US case suggest the decline of organized feminism coupled with the rise of right-wing female politicians could operate as strong brakes against substantive representation in other systems as well. Not only has an organized women’s movement presence in domestic policy debates been muted over time in most major Western democracies, but also anti-feminist discourse and mobilization have tended to widen their reach. Moreover, the socialization effects of feminism
on cohorts of men and women who came of age in the 1960s and following have weakened as new generations reared in “post-feminist” times enter public life.

Gauging substantive representation over a lengthy stretch of time – in which movement fortunes would vary considerably -- is perhaps so intellectually adventurous as to discourage scholarship in this area. If directed toward legislative impact, this type of longitudinal study would require different research designs than have thus far been developed in the field. For example, scholars would need to examine long-term trends in the tenor and content of legislative debates, or in the dynamics of cross-party cooperation among women, presumably with the focus on a single deliberative body. Obviously, the empirical (and particularly data-gathering) challenges facing such a design are daunting.

This paper invokes a different metric to evaluate substantive representation over time. It identifies campaigns for party leadership as a widely ignored, but potentially very useful, barometer of “acting for” representation. This level of political engagement constitutes a layer of activity in which claims-making on behalf of a collective interest would be both possible and measurable, and can be assessed over time by mapping the public statements of candidates for top party posts. From the perspective of movement influence, party leaders in a parliamentary system are potentially the carriers of extra-parliamentary ideas
into mainstream political settings; in this way, they could become promoters or even guarantors of substantive representation.

Canadian federal politics provides a particularly attractive venue for longitudinal research on “acting for” patterns in party leadership. Between 1975 and 2006, nine women mounted 10 campaigns for top positions in parties across the ideological spectrum, from the centre-left New Democratic organization to the hard right Canadian Alliance and merged Conservative formations (see Figure 1). That same chronological period embraced the full sweep of women’s movement fortunes that is available to social science researchers, from the early era of feminist interaction with the party system in the mid-1970s through the decline of organized interest mobilization in the mid-1990s and following.5

In examining leadership politics in Canada, this design offers a cross-time as well as cross-party look at substantive representation. Instead of asking what gains were made in institution X at time Y, we assess a single layer of participation (namely candidacy for federal party leadership) in one country over time. The next sections review the main substantive positions of Canadian leadership candidates since 1975, consider the implications of these patterns for Canadian and comparative scholarship, and suggest possible avenues for future research.
Overall, we report substantive representation claims have become more muted over time. No candidate for federal leadership in Canada was as unambiguously pro-feminist as Rosemary Brown in 1975; the first woman to contest the top post in a major federal party, Brown favoured making the NDP explicitly feminist as well as socialist. Her campaign team drew together many party activists with women’s movement backgrounds; they sought to uphold both sets of principles, meaning Brown’s policy agenda consciously carried the concerns of second-wave feminism into a party formation. This transformative approach to political engagement was succeeded by a less radical but still somewhat challenging orientation in subsequent leadership efforts through the mid-1990s. Since that time, however, women’s campaigns for federal party leadership in Canada -- all of which were mounted in parties of the centre and right -- gave far more limited voice to representational claims than did earlier candidacies.

It should be noted that this study only addresses leadership campaigns in major federal parties, defined as those that both held seats in the House of Commons at the time of the leadership race, and that fielded candidates in most constituencies across Canada. We therefore do not consider efforts by women to win the leadership in 1996 and 1997 of the Bloc Québécois, which ran candidates in Quebec only, or of smaller environmental, far right or far left parties.
Brown as a Transformative Candidate

In examining the tenor and content of women’s campaigns for federal party leadership in Canada, it is difficult not to be struck by the differences between Rosemary Brown’s approach and those of candidates who followed her. More specifically, Brown’s 1975 campaign emphasized the need to change the NDP into a socialist and feminist party. By setting out to transform the substantive directions of one party organization, her bid was distinctive from the less radical approaches adopted by subsequent leadership candidates – including in the NDP – at the federal level.

In February 1975, when she announced her candidacy, Rosemary Brown held a Vancouver-area seat in the British Columbia provincial legislature. She was a political pioneer in many respects; having arrived in Montreal in 1951 as a university student from Jamaica, Brown went on to earn a degree in social work, and became the first woman to contest major party leadership in Canada at the federal level. As the first black woman to hold a provincial or federal legislative seat in the country, she was active in the anti-racism movement and was long remembered for the “Brown is Beautiful” buttons worn by her convention delegates in 1975.6
Brown set out as a leadership candidate to place “feminism in the perspective of a clear analysis of capitalism.” Her campaign team was built around a network of mostly female supporters in each province, many of whom had gathered in July 1974 at an NDP women’s convention held in Winnipeg. Activists who met a year before the leadership vote agreed to work cooperatively to recruit and support a woman candidate for the party’s top position. The firm movement origins of the Brown campaign were clearly reflected in fundraising letters that were later sent to potential donors; appeals for contributions concluded with the phrase, “Yours for feminism and socialism.” Campaign literature distributed by the Brown team urged delegates to “Celebrate International Women’s Year by nominating Rosemary Brown as leader.”

Brown released a series of policy papers during the campaign, and delivered a number of speeches that summarized her issue positions. One position paper released in May 1975, titled “The Leader and the Party,” quoted Brown as follows: “I am dedicated to the development of a socialist society in this country.” A second, titled “Women and the Party,” proposed affirmative action policies in the public and private sectors of the labour force as well as a Ministry of Women’s Rights at the federal level. Brown’s campaign brochure titled “Who is Rosemary Brown?” quoted at length from a speech she delivered
in February 1975; it underlined the direct tie between women’s equality and the goals of a socialist political party:

Indeed to suggest that to be a feminist is a liability to a leadership candidate, surely is to fail to understand that feminism is a revolt against decaying capitalism, surely is to lack the vision to see that feminism, like socialism, calls for a new human community. The question then must be – is it possible for the leader of a socialist party not to be committed to feminism … The answer to this question must be surely ‘NO.’

The links between Brown’s core policy priorities and the growth of a larger women’s movement in Canada were widely acknowledged, including in the mainstream media. For example, Globe and Mail journalist Hugh Winsor observed in one column that “the Brown campaign is more of a movement than an organization. It reflects the desire of women in the NDP to make a strong statement on women’s rights, to make the party and the country realize they are a force that cannot be ignored.”

The 1975 NDP convention was in many respects a showdown between the party’s parliamentary and union establishments, united behind Ontario MP Ed Broadbent, and more leftist elements with extra-parliamentary ties, divided
among Rosemary Brown and a number of other candidates. Brown was clear about her own location on the insider/outsider spectrum: at the convention, she endorsed a radical policy statement advocating public ownership and control of the Canadian economy, and referred in her main speech to party delegates to the importance of seeing socialism and feminism as part of a single outlook. In Brown’s words, “The oppression of women cannot and must not be regarded as an accident of history, an unfortunate mistake.”

Despite firm support for Broadbent among NDP insiders, Brown persevered through five ballots and generated “real apprehension among the party establishment.” She lost on the final ballot, but her strong convention showing drew admiration from many quarters. One newspaper account, for example, described Brown as an “eloquent black feminist … who fought as a gut socialist and champion of women’s and minority rights.” Clearly, Rosemary Brown’s issue agenda as a federal leadership candidate reflected a forceful, well-articulated and unambiguous connection with women’s movement and especially socialist feminist claims of the mid-1970s.

**Challenger Candidates, 1976-1995**

All five candidates who mounted campaigns during the next 20 years demonstrated weaker ties to core women’s movement goals and challenged their
parties to a lesser degree than did Rosemary Brown. To draw out the contrast between her transformative take on substantive representation and the approaches that followed, we employ the term challengers to describe the 1976-1995 group of candidates. In turn, campaigns for federal party leadership in the years after 1995 were even more muted on the group representation dimension; they revealed little or no connection to the policy claims of second-wave feminism, the implications of those agendas for parties or the importance of recruiting women to leadership positions.

Flora MacDonald’s 1976 campaign for the Progressive Conservative leadership is most commonly remembered for producing very disappointing first ballot results. By placing sixth, and last, in the first round of convention voting, the “Flora syndrome” in the jargon of Canadian politics came to mean raising high expectations only to dash them in short order. MacDonald had insisted before declaring her candidacy, however, that “I’m not going to be stampeded into a decision I’m not ready for; I’ve seen too many women used as sacrificial lambs.”18 MacDonald’s policy proposals as a leadership candidate in a centre-right party included eliminating capital punishment, removing abortion from the Criminal Code (which was consistent with organized feminist views) and upholding the norms of fiscal conservatism by limiting social spending.19
In a crowded field of Conservative men, all of whom had likely amassed more financial assets than she had in “girl Friday” administrative positions, MacDonald reached out to the women of Canada, asking each to send her one dollar. Newspaper photo captions then began to describe MacDonald as the “women’s candidate,” to which she responded by insisting she was a “politician who happens to be a woman, not a woman politician.” MacDonald offered a variation on this same view in her main address to convention delegates, stating “I am not a candidate because I am a woman. But I say to you quite frankly that because I am a woman my candidacy helps our party. It shows that in the Conservative Party there are no barriers to anyone who has demonstrated serious intentions and earned the right to be heard.” From the perspective of political representation, MacDonald’s speech argued for fairness and descriptive standing in a centre-right party; it presented a less radical approach than did Rosemary Brown’s advocacy of substantive transformation (notably in a socialist feminist direction) of Canada’s centre-left party.

Audrey McLaughlin, the first woman to win the leadership of a major federal party in Canada, was clearly influenced by Brown’s example. She recalls in her memoirs having supported Brown at the 1975 NDP convention. Like Brown, McLaughlin consulted widely among “above all … the women of the party,” with whom she agreed that “there had to be a credible woman
candidate.” Between 1975 and 1989, according to McLaughlin, the federal NDP had measurably changed to the point that the organization not only employed a full-time women’s organizer (who became McLaughlin’s campaign manager), but also roughly half the delegates at the latter convention were women -- many of whom held positions of responsibility either in the NDP or its affiliated trade unions.

Perhaps because so few policy differences distinguished her from the other leadership candidates, McLaughlin organized her campaign around process arguments. This orientation, in her words, attempted to highlight “my vision of a more open party and a more inclusive, consultative way of operating.” McLaughlin maintained her background in social work -- outside the usual feeder professions of law and politics -- and the fact she was a woman holding a federal seat in the Yukon, were important “to changing the political culture of the party and of the country.” In explaining her victory in 1989, she argued, “Canadians were ready for a new kind of politics and a different kind of politician – not just a woman leader.”

A similar focus on process, albeit with a more critical view of the party establishment, characterized Sheila Copps’ 1990 campaign for the federal Liberal leadership. Unlike the NDP, Ottawa’s perennial opposition party, the Liberals were Canada’s centrist “government party” for much of the twentieth century; at
the time of the 1990 vote, however, the Mulroney Conservatives held power. As an MP from Hamilton, Ontario, Copps launched her campaign with a promise to unify the Liberal party and bring it back to power, in part by enhancing the organization’s base among younger voters and Francophones. Her key policy statements defended the Meech Lake constitutional agreement, despite strong opposition to the deal among peak feminist organizations in English Canada, and proposed the creation of a national child-welfare agency.

Copps condemned the Liberals’ “weakly monitored and unenforceable” spending limits for leadership candidates, arguing they made it impossible for her to compete with the better-financed Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin campaigns. Copps’ leadership organization was chronically short of funds, relied on relatively inexperienced advisors and, unlike the Brown and McLaughlin campaigns in the NDP, “failed to turn the party women’s network into a national base for organizing.” Copps placed third on the first and only convention ballot.

In her 1993 run for the Progressive Conservatives, British Columbia MP Kim Campbell mounted a decidedly process-oriented campaign for federal party leadership. Like McLaughlin and unlike Copps, Campbell was in the field early with a large, well-financed campaign team that included many well-connected party veterans. As the front-runner to succeed party leader and Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, Campbell avoided policy specifics. Instead, she presented herself as a woman and a British Columbian who had a first-hand understanding of exclusion; her goal as leader would be to close the gap between citizens and government.

Campbell spoke at her campaign launch about the need to engage in a dialogue with Canadians, one that was directed toward “changing the way we do politics … a politics of inclusion.” 34 At a party leadership debate, she said no decisions would be made about reductions to the federal deficit until after she consulted with Canadians. 35 Campbell frequently referred to the inclusive approach to decision-making she had employed as federal Minister of Justice (in the areas of rape and gun control legislation), arguing that these examples provided the model for how she would operate as prime minister. 36

This focus on bottom-up policy-making, with consensus-building rather than conflict as the main driver, offered an opening for critics to maintain Campbell’s campaign message lacked substance, and was so “vague and unfocussed” that it could not be taken seriously. 37 With momentum seemingly on the side of caucus colleague Jean Charest, Campbell shifted toward a more aggressive approach that advocated reforming parliament (in a way that paralleled what the opposition Liberals had suggested earlier) and reviewing pension and health care policy. 38 Convention endorsements from Flora
MacDonald and from Canada’s first female cabinet minister at the federal level, Ellen Fairclough, presented a not-so-subtle message to delegates that they could disprove in 1993 “the longstanding notion that the Tory party is anti-woman.”

Campbell went on to win the PC leadership race on the second ballot, and served briefly as prime minister in 1993.

The last of the challenger candidates, Alexa McDonough, was an NDP legislator and provincial leader in Nova Scotia when she announced her intention to seek the party’s top federal post. Inspired by Rosemary Brown and a veteran of the Audrey McLaughlin campaign, McDonough argued she would inject a “fresh perspective” as a candidate from outside the federal caucus.

McDonough pressed other issues including party unity as well as the need to address child poverty and renew the NDP base given the party’s weak electoral showing in 1993. After the top place candidate on the first ballot withdrew from the race and threw his support to her, McDonough succeeded McLaughlin as NDP leader.

Overall, three of the five women who contested federal party leadership between 1976 and 1995 benefited directly from following in the footsteps of earlier candidates. McLaughlin and McDonough operated in the same organizational environment that Brown had set out to transform in 1975, while Campbell employed MacDonald’s experiences in 1976 to lever for better
treatment in 1993. All five challenger candidates, however, articulated fewer substantive representation claims than Brown; as a group, challengers tended to press descriptive claims alongside process arguments that included a critique of the lack of controls on campaign spending in the case of Sheila Copps. Taken together, challenger candidates seemed more comfortable arguing they would alter the way things were done in party politics, than setting out what substantively different outcomes needed to come from parties and parliaments.

**Muted Representational Claims, 2002-2006**

Campaigns for federal leadership in 2002 and following tended to play down or ignore the substantive as well as process dimensions that rested at the core of many earlier efforts by female candidates. In fact, Diane Ablonczy’s run for the Canadian Alliance leadership represented the mirror opposite of Rosemary Brown’s case, in that the former took place in a hard right party that enjoyed strong ties with fundamentalist, evangelical and anti-feminist interests.43 Candidates during this period who mentioned issues of representation, as Sheila Copps did in 2003, tended to project a diffuse concern for women as one of many diverse marginalized groups in Canada, which was different from an earlier and more focused emphasis on women’s equality.
In 2002, Calgary MP Diane Ablonczy contested the leadership of the Canadian Alliance, the successor organization to the hard-right Reform party. Her platform emphasized unity between the Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives, in order for the political right to win power at the federal level. Ablonczy relied less on the support of social conservative groups including anti-abortion interests than did candidates Stockwell Day and Stephen Harper -- who captured the top Alliance post in 2002 and then the merged Conservative leadership in 2004. In fact, a leading newspaper columnist predicted Ablonczy would lose the 2002 vote because she was not conservative enough for the party grassroots.

Like her 1990 bid, Sheila Copps’ 2003 campaign for the Liberal leadership started out behind in terms of money, organization and support. Copps later alleged the Liberal party had failed to control dirty tricks and “widespread, organized fraud” that benefited Paul Martin, the victorious candidate on the first and only ballot. Copps’ campaign statements endorsed gay marriage, a direct federal role in social housing, the use of budget surpluses to pay for increased social spending, and more immigrant, gay, aboriginal and women participants in Canadian politics. By grouping women with other marginalized interests in this platform, and by emphasizing descriptive rather than substantive representation
claims, Copps echoed a more general shift in Canadian politics away from rights-based equality talk, toward a softer diversity discourse.\textsuperscript{50}

In 2004, Belinda Stronach declared her candidacy for the leadership of the newly created Conservative party, which drew together the Progressive Conservative and Alliance formations. Stronach’s links with her father’s highly successful business empire meant the campaign had a plethora of funds, paid staff and political connections, despite its late start and the candidate’s lack of party as well as legislative experience. Key issue positions she advanced included unifying Canada’s political right, improving economic competitiveness by “baking a bigger economic pie,”\textsuperscript{51} reducing taxes,\textsuperscript{52} permitting a larger role for private provision in the health care system and creating a shared continental security perimeter.\textsuperscript{53} Stronach also endorsed same-sex marriage (which distinguished her from many other Conservatives), greater funding for Canada’s military, and shutting down the national gun registry.\textsuperscript{54} Despite these policy statements, her leadership bid was widely criticized for a lack of content; Stronach was viewed as operating in a “bubble,” and as “little more than a cardboard cutout fronting the ambitions of her backroom campaigners.”\textsuperscript{55} She “placed a distant second” in the Conservative leadership vote.\textsuperscript{56}

Martha Hall Findlay, the most recent candidate to compete in a federal leadership race, was the first declared candidate in what became a crowded field
of Liberal aspirants in 2006. Findlay presented herself as a bilingual lawyer and businesswoman from Toronto; never having held public office, however, she had to work hard to raise her public profile. Findlay’s main policy statements defended the need to protect Canada’s environment, provide greater public investment in urban transit, and offer “fiscal conservatism as well as social programs.” At one party fundraising event, Findlay explicitly rejected notions that her gender carried substantive meaning: “I said I am not here to be a woman in politics. I am here to be in politics. We need to talk about what exactly we’re here for, and it’s the economy, it’s foreign policy, it’s the environment.” Yet from the convention podium, Findlay referred to the descriptive representation dimension by reminding Liberal delegates she was the only woman on the ballot; in her words, “we are not yet inclusive enough.” She placed last of eight candidates on the first ballot.

**Conclusions**

What implications does this study hold for Canadian and comparative work in the field, and what lines of enquiry does it suggest for future research? At the level of core empirical findings, our review of ten federal leadership campaigns by nine women reveals a clear pattern of declining substantive claims on parties between 1975 and 2006. The contrast between Rosemary Brown’s socialist
feminist argumentation of 1975 and the era of challenger candidates from 1976 through 1995 reflected how process-oriented and descriptive representation positions became the norm in that second phase of leadership candidacies. In the years between 2002 and 2006, representational claims were even less visible than in the challenger period, since female candidates for federal leadership in the former era relied little on gendered substantive, process or descriptive themes.

This pattern of weakened representational voice over time is consistent with perspectives in the comparative literature. Reingold (2000) and Dodson (2006), for example, point toward the rise of conservative Republican women in US legislatures as exerting a powerful brake on assumptions that growing numbers of elected women would promote movement claims in the public arena. In the Canadian context, declining representational rhetoric from federal leadership candidates is consistent with the simultaneous erosion of a national women’s movement presence from the late Mulroney years through the current period. More specifically, the virtual disappearance of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women as a Canada-wide, or even English Canadian, umbrella voice for organized feminism means gendered policy claims have not been clearly and consistently articulated by a peak social movement unit for nearly 15 years.\textsuperscript{61} NAC’s decline has thus coincided with a measurable loss of women’s movement content in the agendas of female party leadership
candidates at the federal level, which suggests that feminism has waned as an influence on party agendas as well as the socialization experiences of individual politicians.

Moreover, the process orientation of women who won party leadership in the challenger years meant this view tended to overshadow other aspects of representation. McLaughlin, Campbell and McDonough all underlined the new approaches and fresh outlooks they would bring to party life, as encapsulated most notably in Campbell’s phrase “changing the way we do politics.” Unfortunately, the electoral decline of the parties they led during the periods they held top posts meant talk about difference at the level of process risked being ridiculed as a cover for not only lack of content, but also lack of political success. Whether other leaders – male or female – could have done better in the same circumstances is ultimately unknowable, but the conflation of bold process claims by candidates with weak electoral showings once they won top positions took much of the wind out of women’s political momentum in Canada.

In a more comparative light, one lesson to be drawn from Canadian experiences is that relatively high numbers of women participants do not equate with strong substantive representation. Since no female leadership candidate at the federal level after Rosemary Brown articulated as direct, radical and substantive a policy platform as she espoused, it would be misleading to assume
the nine campaigns that followed hers offered anything approaching a ninefold increase in movement presence on the political scene. In fact, the larger message from these data is that shifts from a strong transformative toward a process-oriented and then to a muted representational agenda made “acting for” claims less visible between 1975 and 2006, which contradicts assumptions that increasing numbers would translate over time into the opposite pattern.

Clearly, data presented in this paper offer only one barometric reading of a much larger and more complex political phenomenon. Researchers in the future would be well-advised to examine over-time and cross-party leadership patterns in other contexts, including at the provincial party level in Canada, in other Westminster party systems, and in US presidential and vice-presidential nomination campaigns. Tracing the impact on party organizations, party systems and party agendas of the engagement of women leadership candidates is also essential in order to know better whether what Pitkin termed “standing for” representation has held significant consequences for political action.
NOTES


4 See Reingold, *Representing Women*, 8; Dodson, *The Impact of Women in Congress*, 73.


7 Rosemary Brown declaration of leadership intentions, 12 February 1975, in Rare Books and Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library, consulted 20 July 2006.


9 Fundraising letter from Hilda L. Thomas to potential Brown supporter, in Rare Books and Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library, consulted 20 July 2006.

10 ‘Rosemary for Leader of the NDP,’ campaign literature, 1975.

11 Document in Rare Books and Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library, consulted 20 July 2006.

12 See position paper titled “Women and the Party,” drawn from Brown’s speech to NDP Women’s Conference, Winnipeg, 1974, in Rare Books and Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library, consulted 20 July 2006. On Brown’s support for such a department, see also Gray, “Has Rosemary Brown’s socialist image more style than substance?”

14 Hugh Winsor, “Style of Candidates as important as content,” Globe and Mail (7 July 1975), 1.


16 Nick Hills, “For Broadbent, the West is the Test,” Winnipeg Tribune (3 July 1975).

17 “Broadbent: NDP Hopes He’s Answer,” Winnipeg Tribune (8 July 1975).


19 See Sylvia B. Bashevkin, Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 92.

20 Description of MacDonald appears in Tom Hazlitt, “Girl’s Fight for an ‘Independent’ Canada, Toronto Star (7 May 1971).

21 See Bashevkin, Toeing the Lines, 92.

22 Flora MacDonald leadership address, as quoted in Alvin Armstrong, Flora MacDonald (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1976), 192.

23 Audrey McLaughlin with Rick Archbold, A Woman’s Place: My Life and Politics (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1992), 63.

24 McLaughlin, A Woman’s Place, 54, 52.
See McLaughlin, *A Woman’s Place*, 64, 52-3.

McLaughlin, *A Woman’s Place*, 57.

McLaughlin, *A Woman’s Place*, 56.

McLaughlin, *A Woman’s Place*, 58.


Campbell as quoted in Fife, *Kim Campbell*, 185; see also Ken MacQueen, “Aw-shucks and arrogance: Kim fails to answer big questions,” *Ottawa Citizen* (26 March 1993), A14.

Fife, *Kim Campbell*, 186, 188.


38 See Fife, *Kim Campbell*, 189.


44 Simpson, “Moderates among the ideological heathens.”

46 Simpson, “Moderates among the ideological heathens.”


50 This shift was also clear in discussions of municipal policy-making and representation. See Sylvia Bashevkin, *Tales of Two Cities: Women and Municipal Restructuring in London and Toronto* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), chap. 3.


56 Gloria Galloway, “Runner-up confident next stop in career is Ottawa,” Globe and Mail (22 March 2004), A5.

57 Jill Mahoney, “I’m doing this because I know I can contribute,” Globe and Mail (18 September 2006), A3.

58 Roy MacGregor, “How ‘Martha Who Who’ joined the big-name race that has yet to take place,” Globe and Mail (16 March 2006), A2.

59 Roy MacGregor, “Dion took the most votes but wasn’t the only winner at the Liberal convention, Globe and Mail (5 December 2006), A2.

60 “From the Podium,” Globe and Mail (2 December 2006), A11.

61 See Bashevkin, Women on the Defensive.
### Figure 1
OVERVIEW OF WOMEN PARTY LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES, CANADA, FEDERAL LEVEL ONLY, 1975-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Ideology</th>
<th>Party Competitiveness</th>
<th>Win/lose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>left</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacDonald</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>centre-right</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLaughlin</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>left</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copps</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>centre</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>centre-right</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonough</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>left</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablonczy</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>right</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copps</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>centre</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronach</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>right</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findlay</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>centre</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>lose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite increasing women graduates, persistent gender gaps exist in the physician workforce, and in particular in some specialties [7,8,9,10] and in positions of leadership in all specialties [11]. Female medical graduates report that they specifically do not choose certain specialties such as critical care medicine (CCM) as their first choice [12]. Only 30% of the survey respondents indicated that they were the national certifying bodies for intensive care training and assessment, and the distribution of data by gender was not available amongst those societies which reported the proportions of trainees.