PERPETUATING PARANOIA:
Citizenship, Civil Liberties and Counter-Terrorism

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Abstract

The adoption of various anti-terror policies by Western governments post-9/11 has generated discussion on the legitimacy of such counter-terror mechanisms and their influence on the rights of citizens. This paper aims at establishing a connection between counter-terrorism, civil liberties and citizenship with the intent of expanding the already existing literature on citizen’s sentiments towards counter-terrorism measures. While presenting data from various research studies from Western nation-states, it is my intention to bring attention to the feelings of racialized citizens as primary targets of the presented counter-terror tools. I will argue that there is reason to assume that such counter-terrorism policies presented foster the development of what I refer to as paranoia for racialized citizens living in Western countries. I will suggest that there is reason to suspect that these mechanisms advance unintended consequences that may exacerbate what the initial policies aimed at deterring.

Key words: citizenship, racialization, racialized citizenship, civil liberties, counter-terrorism, surveillance, paranoia, Islamophobia, xenophobia, self-surveillance
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PART I: INTRODUCTION

Since the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11th, 2001, followed by many other attacks including the London Underground bombings and the Madrid train bombings, many Western governments have argued that certain measures must be made in order to counter terrorism and protect national security (Grayling 2010, Prieto 2009; Beyer and Bauer, 2009). Western countries such as Britain, the United States of America and Canada have all taken legal and political measures to fight what former President of the United States, George W. Bush coined in 2001 as the war on terrorism (Duffy, 2015). It is these precautions, referred to as counter-terrorism tools, which I will continuously be addressing throughout this paper.

First, this paper aims to establish how and why certain legal instruments incorporated post-9/11 has influenced the lives of racialized citizens and immigrants living in the West. Secondly, this paper will examine how racialization of citizenship greatly influences citizen’s sentiments towards surveillance practices, specifically racialized citizens. I will examine how all citizens—with emphasis on racialized citizens—feel about compromising their individual civil liberties for national security through counter-terrorism tools such as surveillance. I will argue that such procedures foster the development of paranoia for certain members of society, especially for those who are racialized. I believe there is a gap in academic literature that does not acknowledge this fear and distress, which I will refer to as perpetuated paranoia.

The data for my paper will be obtained from three academic works from three different Western nation-states: the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. The U.S. study is a quantitative research study conducted by Davis and Silver (2004). The researchers used
surveys to acquire the opinions of U.S. citizens and their sentiments towards compromising their civil liberties to protect national security through counter-terrorism efforts. The U.K. study was conducted by Jarvis and Lister (2013), where the researchers used qualitative research methods via focus groups to understand how racialized citizens feel about counter-terrorism practices and their day-to-day lived experiences. Finally, I will examine a Canadian qualitative study by Baljit Nagra (2011), who used interviews to observe how Canadian Muslims felt about their Canadian citizenship in a post-9/11 Era.

It is with these studies that I will be able to support my argument that there is reason to assume that such policies further disenfranchise racialized citizens and create a worrying environment that allows these citizens to live in fear and distress. It is these anxieties that create a sense of mistrust in Western governments, which in turn can be used as propaganda for extremist recruiters to attract these individuals who may feel isolated and alone while living in Western nation-states. This in turn creates a mindset of self-surveillance for racialized citizens, which I refer to as paranoia. When Western governments create this dilemma for these individuals, they must consider the repercussions or unintended consequences these efforts may have in the future for the entire society.

This paper will be structured as followed: in Part Two I will identify and define key terms that are important for constructing my argument. Some of the key terms include: counter-terrorism, civil liberties, racialization and paranoia. In this section I will further elaborate on how and why these terms are important for my argument. These terms will allow the reader to understand the framework of my argument. In Part Three, I will examine the theoretical framework of racialized citizenship. It is within this
theoretical framework that I will conceptualize my fundamental argument, while distinctively focusing on identity politics, Islamophobia and Eurocentric ideology. In Part Four, I will examine three major research studies, one from the UK (Jarvis and Lister 2013) another from the U.S. (Davis and Silver 2004) and finally one from Canada (Nagra, 2011). I will illustrate through these research studies that Western citizens are hesitant to compromise their civil liberties to counter terrorism. In Part Five, I will examine civil liberties in the West while concentrating on various measures created in Western countries, including the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, the 2011 UK government’s CONTEST strategy for combating terrorism and Canada’s most recent 2015 Bill C-51, anti-terrorism legislation. Finally, I will conclude this paper by summarizing the key findings of my paper and proposing that scholarship should continue on examining the commonalities and nuances of the experiences of racialized citizens in local, national and supranational levels, specifically focusing on the day-to-day life experiences of racialized citizens when addressing counter-terrorism policies and procedures.
PART II: KEY TERMS

In order to establish a comprehensible foundation for this paper, it is imperative to outline and clearly define the language that will continuously be used. It should be noted that numerous scholars have interpreted the terminology and language used throughout this work differently. However, my intent is not to go back and forth with what pertains to certain terms, but rather to clearly outline what I will be referring to within the context of my argument.

i. ISLAMOPHOBIA

The term Islamophobia has generated a rich amount of discussion in academia following the terrorist events of 9/11. In Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy by Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenber (2008), the authors attest that Islamophobia has become an instrument used to separate two cultures. The authors state that when enacted by Westerners and perceived by Muslims, Islamophobia promotes an *us vs. them* paradigm by playing a critical role “in convincing many that a civilization clash will be inevitable” (2008, p.3). Though Gottschalk and Greenber are convinced that Islamophobia is a social anxiety that has transcended throughout the world, other authors, including Chris Allen (2010) have been more hesitant on adopting such a universal term.

In Allen’s book Islamophobia (2010), he acknowledges that the term lacks clarity and that if not a final solution, there should be an attempt to provide a “newer and more adequate and appropriate theoretical definition and conceptualisation of what Islamophobia is” (2010, p.138). Conversely, other authors such as Yahya Birt, have addressed the issue of Islamophobia becoming a heavily politicised concept that has “been manifested primarily as the fear of Muslim political agency” (Birt, 2010, p. 117).
Birt argues that the political agency of the Muslim has become dependent on what the West feels is acceptable—that being ‘good Muslims’. He argues that by Western governments intervening directly with various Islamic institutions, including mosques and Qur’an schools, Islamophobia has surpassed certain social anxieties and has been normalized to become a way of controlling the political agency of all Muslims. Similarly, in Mahmood Mamdani’s, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror (2004), he suggests that “good” and “bad” Muslims are political identities and not religious or cultural ones. He argues that when Muslims do not publically denounce acts of terrorism, they are automatically presumed to be “bad Muslims”. These discourses in Western societies only further ‘others’ Muslims, who are “obligated to prove their credentials” (p.15). As such, Islamophobia is not simply a social anxiety that has generated concerns of Westerners, but it has been applied in terms of rhetoric, policy and law as well.

Therefore, when I refer to Islamophobia throughout my writing, like Gottschalk and Greenber (2008), I too wish to view Islamophobia as a social anxiety that has been heightened following 9/11 and various other terrorist events that have occurred in the past 14 years. However, I also wish to remind readers that Islamophobia is not just a feeling or a social anxiety, but it has also become worse due to certain policies and laws that I will address in a later section of this paper. It is these laws that have legitimized the state’s ability to treat Muslims as ‘suspects’, rather than citizens. Therefore, it is not my intent to suggest that the term itself is perfect and applicable to all presented material in this paper, but rather it should be used as a basis of what has stemmed from numerous events.
ii. XENOPHOBIA

As pointed out by Tomaz Mastnak (2010), xenophobia is a term that is a close cousin to Islamophobia. Mastnak suggests that xenophobia “signifies hostility toward a wide array of foreigners” (Mastnak, 2010, p.29). He rightly links both xenophobia and Islamophobia to transnationalism, specifically transregional immigration. It is important to note that xenophobia is not racism. Author of *Xenophobia: The Violence of Fear and Hate* (2010), Jamie Bordeau, explains that even though racism and xenophobia “sometimes go hand in hand, it is possible for people of the same race to be xenophobic towards one another” (Bordeau, 2010, p.4).

Like Mastnak (2010), Bordeau suggests the association between xenophobia and Islamophobia is greatly linked, she states,

“The world has witnessed some spectacular terrorist attacks in recent history, with a number of them carried out by Muslim extremist groups. A troubling phenomenon that has resulted across the globe is the growth of Islamophobia, a form of xenophobia that involves prejudice against the religion of Islam and discrimination against all those who classify themselves as Muslims” (p.10).

Such social terms are important to address in respect to this paper due to the reality of many Western states relying on immigration to prosper and survive. When individuals, especially those who are racialized immigrants, face discrimination due to their religious practices, they may feel isolated and detached. As such, this creates an *us vs. them* paradigm.

iii. CITIZENSHIP

Most discussions of modern citizenship refer to T.H. Marshall (1950) who defined citizenship as full membership in a community. According to Marshall, citizenship is a status that should assure rights and duties. Marshall outlines three key
elements to citizenship: civil, political and social. He believed that these three elements were interconnected but only after civil rights were acquired first, followed by political and social rights. However, the concept of citizenship itself has existed for centuries and has continuously been criticized and challenged throughout history.

The term originated from the Greek philosopher and scientist Aristotle. Aristotle believed that citizens were individuals who participated in civil life of ruling and they in turn would also be ruled. He believed that citizenship was a relative term and recognized that the concept could change ‘depending on the features of any given constitution’ (Heater, 2004, p.4). However, the issue of citizenship has always been ambiguous, as mentioned by Heater (2004), citizenship during the time of “the Greek city state was a privilege” (p. 5). The concept of citizenship was only available to individuals who met certain standards and it was mostly an inherited feature; “resident foreigners, women, slaves and the peasantry of the rural environment of the city were excluded” (p.5). These conditions on what citizenship once meant are important to note, for even today, citizenship is still abstract. Brubaker (1992) identified citizenship as an ongoing “abstract, formal construct” (p. 30).

Citizenship can also be used an exclusionary tool in the sense that it can exclude non-citizens from “territories, labour markets, and welfare institutions” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 40). Moreover, it is citizenship that guarantees and protects various rights of citizens, something that cannot be applied universally to all persons living within the territory of a nation-state. The notion that citizenship remains abstract today is appropriate in respect to this paper because if an individual who holds citizenship, but is not privileged (as was the case in ancient Greece), then the principles that citizenship stands for remain weak.
As outlined by Will Kymlicka in *Multicultural Citizenship* (1996), there is a need to challenge the common citizenship idea, that all citizens are entitled to the same rights. He challenges this idea due to the fact that minorities within the nation-state, including Aboriginals and ethnic minorities, do not hold the same privileges as the majority and as such, their rights as citizens are compromised. He states,

“Moreover, a regime of common citizenship means that the minority has no way to limit its vulnerability to the economic and political decisions of the majority, since the boundaries and powers of internal political units are defined to suit the administrative convenience of the majority, not the self-government claims of the minority” (Kymlicka, 1996, p. 183).

Thus, when individuals who identify as racialized persons or Aboriginals, the philosophy of common citizenship may or may not apply to them in the same respect as it would for someone who is privileged.

iv. **RACIALIZATION**

Racialization recognizes the social construction of ‘race’. As outlined by Karim Murji and John Solmos (2005), the term racialization has evolved into an umbrella term that addresses various issues of racial and ethnic relations. The authors note that racialization differs from race because it “emphasizes the social and psychological processes that puts people into racial categories” (p.8). Similarly, the authors note racialization is not simply race in a biological context, but it also takes into consideration the significance of “social, economic, cultural and psychological practices” (p.8). This widely used term is essential in understanding social relations, especially when examining the interactions of multicultural Western nation-states. In addition, contemporary racism tends to denigrate groups on the basis of cultural/religious rather than biological differences. Razack (20008) suggests that the culturalization of racism
often operates in issues concerning Muslim minorities in Western societies. It is for this reason that it is important to recognize and define racialization when referring to racialized citizens living in the West.

v. COUNTER-TERRORISM (SURVEILLANCE)

Since 9/11 many Western nation-states have taken various measures to combat terrorism. These measures have regularly been referred to as counter-terrorism mechanisms, instruments or tools. As outlined in *Liberty in the Age of Terror: A Defence of Civil Liberties and Enlightenment Values* by A.C. Grayling (2009), various surveillance instruments have been used as counter-terrorism mechanisms. Grayling acknowledges that the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, monitoring mobile phones, email and Internet transactions along with bank account transactions and other surveilling practices have been exercised in many Western countries. Though there are a variety of other counter-terrorism tools that have been used by Western governments, for the purpose of this paper, when I refer to counter-terrorism efforts, I primarily mean those that involve legal surveilling operations by intelligence agencies.

It is important for readers to understand that Western governments have legitimized these tools in a rather ambiguous manner. Though the United Nations, as an international body, has directly encouraged transparency within its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2012), some of its other member Western nation-states such as Australia, the UK, Canada and the United States have not been so clear with their strategies.

For example, the government of Australia, has outlined five pillars in its 2015 Counter-Terrorism Strategy: challenging violent extremism ideologies, stopping people
from becoming terrorists, shaping the global environment, disrupting terrorist activities within Australia and effective response and recovery (Government of Australia, 2015).

However, there is not much clarity when it comes to “disrupting terrorist activities within Australia”; rather there is a direct reference to Australia’s intelligence services and law enforcement. The government document states:

“Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to disrupt terrorist activity. They have a good history of disrupting numerous terrorist plots. Low-capability and limited-preparation attacks such as knife attacks present a challenge to police and intelligence agencies because they involve little or no lead time, making them difficult to detect” (Government of Australia, 2015, p.7).

Similarly, the government of Canada with its 2014 Public Report On The Terrorist Threat to Canada uses vague language when referring to its counter terrorism practices. The Report states,

“The Government will continue to take all appropriate action to counter threats to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests, whether those threats occur at home or abroad. This includes addressing extremist travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes” (Government of Canada, 2014)

These official documents do not provide enough information for citizens to understand what is exactly entailed when referring to “appropriate action” which can allow certain actions (including travelling abroad) to be interpreted differently depending on the individual being questioned. Sherene Razack shares this concern in her book Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (2008). When addressing the powers of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and their use of security certificates on permanent residents and foreign nationals, she states,

“In security-certificate cases, CSIS establishes who possesses ‘Islamic extremist’ ideology. Once marked by bearing the stain of disloyalty and violence associated with this ideology, a detainee can hardly challenge the determination owing not only to secret evidence but also to the very amorphousness of a charge built on latent qualities. The ‘crime’ in security cases is not a crime but something born in
the blood or psyche, a hidden indicator of a latent capacity to be violent. Because the capacity to be violent is an internal quality, people are condemned for what they might do (based on who they are) and not for what they have done” (Razack, 2008, p. 35).

Similar language can be found in the strategies of many Western nation-states counter-terrorism policies, with a direct reference to intelligence agencies. It is these agencies that collect various data by surveillance, “in order to catch or pre-empt the few who do (or might) pose some kind of risk to them through crime or terror” (Grayling 2009, p.98). As such, when referring to counter-terrorism throughout this paper, I will link intelligence agencies and surveillance practices in order to establish why some citizens may feel a sense of mistrust and fear from their own governments.

vi. CIVIL LIBERTIES

The adoption of civil liberties in many Western nation-states, through legislation and practice, has been recognized as a fundamental aspect of Western democracy and principle. As pointed out by Samuel Walker in Civil Liberties in America: A Reference Handbook (2004), “civil liberties are a fundamental element of a free society” (Walker 2004, p.1). Walker argues that these civil liberties are the individual rights people have over and against the power of the government. These civil liberties are often linked with human rights, however human rights differ because it focuses on other issues such as, “poverty, disease and homelessness” (Head, 2004, p.3).

Through its Bill of Rights (including freedom of expression, right of due process and the right to privacy, along with many other freedoms) the United States of America has become synonymous with civil liberties. Other Western nation-states have adopted
similar constitutional protections to ensure that a wall of separation exists between the government and the people. Canada has adopted similar legislations with its Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was signed into law in 1982. Prior to the Charter, there was only a Bill of Rights that did not protect such rights under the constitution, however the charter guaranteed these rights were protected in the written Constitution (Canadian Department of Justice 2015).

As already suggested, there are many civil liberties that one could refer to, however for the purpose of this paper I will mainly be referring to freedom of speech. A.C Grayling (2009) argues that, “free speech is the fundamental civil liberty” (Grayling, 2009, p.63). He suggests that free speech is paramount to other liberties due to the fact that without it, there would be no way to claim or defend them. Grayling addresses the limitations on free speech, such as shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre but does not endorse or encourage censorship by the state or self-censorship. He states,

“If censorship or self-censorship prevented any government or civil society organizations from receiving scrutiny, or if it was no longer possible to poke fun as one form of challenge, society would be in an unhealthy state. Censorship and the censorious always threaten to make it so” (Grayling 2009. P.59-60).

Thus, when there are efforts made to limit expression in Western liberal democracies it is damaging to the fundamental principles that have been protected to ensure such freedoms continue to exist. Throughout this paper, I will address challenges to such civil liberties that has been presented and legitimized by Western nation-states. These issues have generated much discussion and have been contested by courts and various groups as well.

However, one of the biggest concerns associated with civil liberties that I will address in this paper is the reality that they have become stereotypical, specifically racialized stereotypes. In his article Civil Liberties In The Era of Mass Terrorism (2003),
Russell Hardin explains that racialized individuals living in countries such as the U.S. have experienced a breach to their civil liberties in a stereotypical way. Hardin writes, “We are entering a new era in which civil liberties will be stereotypical. I and most U.S. citizens who are likely to read this paper enjoy greater protection of our civil liberties than do other U.S. citizens who are easily profiled as Arabic-American or, sadly still, African-American” (Hardin, 2003 p.81).

The concern that racialized citizens living in the West may have their civil liberties compromised should not only be a concern for racialized persons but for all citizens living in the West. Eroding such liberties little by little, with racialized persons being the first to experience this harsh reality, may eradicate the liberties that citizens hold today. A system of tyranny, where the government remains paramount to the people and acts as a watch-dog rather than as a democratic representation of the people, is what should be mostly feared when we compromise liberties. If we allow our liberties to be compromised for security, we open a door to many other unimaginable activities, such as becoming mere numbers and categories. As Grayling (2010) warns, if we allow our information to be so freely collected, how do we know that governments will not share such information with private companies?

Moreover, by following such practices, Western governments may be potentially exacerbating the issue of violent extremism—or terrorism. When governments isolate groups and create an us vs. them paradigm in both real and relative terms, they further disenfranchise groups that may feel marginalized within society (Grayling 2010; Prieto 2009). This argument will be continuously examined throughout this paper and defended with various studies.
vii. PARANOIA

The term paranoia is often associated with the psyche of an individual; a psychological condition that falls under the DSM-5. When people hear the word paranoia, they may automatically assume a delusional individual who holds mistrust or suspicious characteristics. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the term paranoia has two definitions; the first gives a clinical definition that is primarily used within the medical community. The second is a more general definition, which states, “any unjustified or excessive sense of fear; especially an unreasonable fear of the actions or motives of others” (“Paranoia”, 2005). The part of the definition that I will focus on when I acknowledge paranoia is the “excessive sense of fear”. I want to caution readers that when I refer to paranoia, I do not wish to claim that the living experiences of racialized citizens are “unreasonable” or “unjustified”, but rather it is a sense of fear that has become entrenched as normative behaviour for individuals who experience anxieties from the actions of Western governments. I believe the term paranoia and the perspective that is most commonly associated with it, is far too limited. It is my hope to expand the ideas associated with the term through a new perspective and lens.

As conceptualized by David Harper in *The Politics of Paranoia: Paranoid Positioning and Conspiratorial Narratives in Surveillance Society* (2008), we must view the term paranoia as inconstant. Harper states,

> “Rather than viewing paranoia as a static pathological identity we can view it in more of a fluid and dynamic manner—as a position which may be adopted in a particular context and time for a variety of reasons” (p. 23).

Harper specifically observes the surveilling state, arguing that with the convenience of the Internet and with the increase of surveillance, individuals are becoming (or should be)
more paranoid. He argues that a “cultural paranoia” exists in contemporary society due to a rise in various surveillance practices. He notes,

“The UK’s Office of Surveillance Commissioners’ (2006) report details the large scale of surveillance currently conducted. During 2005-2006 there were: 435 intrusive surveillance authorisations; 2,310 property interference authorisations; 23, 628 directed surveillance authorisations; and 4,559 Covert Human Intelligence Sources recruited by law enforcement agencies” (p.3).

Again, though these specific statistics are directly from the UK, similar practices have occurred in many Western nation-states post 9/11. Though some readers may associate paranoia to conspiracy theories, it should be noted that though there is a link between the two, they are different in the sense that “conspiracy theories, in turn, lead to paranoia about surveillance” (Harper, 2008, p.2). However, for the purpose of this paper, I do not want to focus on conspiracy theories and their link to paranoia, but rather focus on the insecurities that may affect individuals living in Western nations. This fear and distress that certain communities or individuals may feel is an important factor to consider when addressing counter-terrorism and civil liberties.

I do not want readers to correlate the term paranoia to a delusion or a feeling that lacks creditability or legitimacy, but rather as a manifestation of self-surveillance that has created anxieties for certain citizens—especially for those who are racialized. The concept of self-surveillance was greatly influenced by the work of Foucault and his interpretation of the Panopticon in Discipline and Punish (1979). Social theorist and English philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed the Panopticon as an institutional building in the late 18th century. As explained by Paulo Vaz and Fernanda Bruno in Types of Self-Surveillance: From Abnormality to Individuals ‘At Risk’ (2003), referencing Foucault (1979), the authors write,
“Bentham conceived a semi-circular prison in which each inmate was placed in an individual lit cell visible from a tower located at the centre of the semicircle. The high tower had windows from which a possible surveillant could watch every cell. Thanks to an ingenious design of these windows, no prisoner was able to ascertain if he or she was actually being observed or even if there was anyone in the tower. The prisoners in the cells knew that they were always subjected to virtual observation without ever being able to confirm its actuality” (p. 275).

The purpose of the tower is to instil a certain fear within people that would in turn allow them to become paranoid and watch what they do more cautiously. Foucault states that the Panopticon is used “(…) to induce in the inmates a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1979: 201).

It is this same concept that I refer to when referring to paranoia, not that the paranoia an individual has towards their government watching them has no merit or is a delusion, but rather a tool that has been generated from various legitimized policies and practices. These policies and practices create a sense of fear for individuals, especially racialized persons, to remain demure and controlled, arguably taking away such civil liberties like their freedom of speech. Because if they speak out of terms—out of what is socially ‘acceptable’—they may or may not be being watched.

The idea of ‘big brother’ or the government watching over its citizens is not a new phenomenon but due to the rise of rapid technology, it has generated much more attention and discussion. Throughout this paper, I will refer to the idea of a paranoid state of mind being not sufficiently emphasized within studies and literature.
PART III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
RACIALIZED CITIZENSHIP

It is important to identify what both racialization and citizenship represent independently, as I have already established in Part 2 of this paper. However, in respect to this paper, the term I will mostly refer to is racialized citizenship. I will use term as a theoretical framework, one that acknowledges the challenges racialized citizens in Western nation-states encounter within their social environments.

According to Paul Silverstein in Kabyle Immigrant Politics and Racialized Citizenship in France (2008),

“Citizenship retains a racialized dimension, both in terms of its criteria access (often mediated by ties of genealogy) and in terms of its ongoing “unequal politics”, which maintain informal, embedded distinctions between “homely” and “naturalized” citizens”(p.27).

The idea of a “good citizen”, one that meets all expected criteria, can be found by observing Western nation-states’ immigration policies throughout history. Various countries have historically adopted “White-only” immigration policies (Triadafilopoulos 2013; Kelley and Trebleckft 2010; Goulbourne 1991). In Harry Goulbourne’s Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain (1991), Goulbourne addresses the fact that in countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the political power to keep out non-whites allowed the country to remain mostly homogenous while being careful of keeping the non-white immigrant population low. By the 1960s, largely due to the rise of neo-liberalism, there was a shift in many Western nation-states to allow skilled workers to immigrate, including non-Whites. For example in 1962, Canada adopted a universal admissions policy for what some believe was to help Canada’s growing economy.
However, others have noted that perhaps it was not only to help the economic position of the country but was a political move. In “Dismantling White Canada: Race, Rights and the Origins of the Points System” (2013), Triadafilopoulos suggests that the 1962 regulations change “was driven by political rather than economic reasons” (p. 24). He further suggests that the changes were “primarily aimed at mollifying domestic and international critics of racial discrimination, rather than opening up new sources of skilled migrants” (p. 24). While authors such as Triadafilopoulos have addressed the criteria process of racialized individuals, it is important to note that being granted citizenship after one immigrates, does not make a racialized person’s life in a predominantly White nation-state any easier.

Individuals who are racialized face the obstacles of hegemonic constructs of race within Western nation-states and thus are already vulnerable targets to have their rights infringed upon by the dominant governing body (Truesdell, 2014). In “Racialized Citizenship Among Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) Organizations in England”, Nicole Truesdell (2014), addresses how these challenges advance isolation for racialized persons living in the UK, she states,

“In the UK, citizenship rights for Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups are accessed through, and limited by, a racialized relationship and engagement with the British state. Increased non-white immigration post-1945 into Britain led the British government to redefine Britishness in terms of “whiteness.” This active racialized re-creation of British national identity constantly questioned the legitimacy of non-white communities” (p.1).

Sherene Razack (2002) also echoes similar sentiments of white supremacy and dominance that continues to exist in Canada. Though Canada’s history differs from the UK, the theme of racialized immigration transcends the work of both Razack and Truesdell. It is the theme of being ‘othered’ that continuously surfaces within these
discourses. Razack argues in *Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society* (2002) that there is this white settler nationalism that continues in Canada and totally disregards the existence of Aboriginal peoples and racialized peoples. This “logic assumes white resourcefulness, ingenuity and hardwork” (Das Gupta et. al, 2007, p. 62).

Razack argues,

“A white settler society continues to be structured by a racial hierarchy. In the national mythologies of such societies, it is believed that white people came first and that it is they who principally developed the land; Aboriginal people are presumed to be mostly dead or assimilated. European settlers thus become the original inhabitants and the group most entitled to the fruits of citizenship” (pp. 1-2).

This mentality or “national mythology” is what leads to racialized citizens to feel vulnerable and second-class, thus not having their civil liberties fully protected. The same feature can be witnessed in other Western nation-states such as Australia. In *White Nations: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* by Ghassan Hage (2000), the issue of an unequal distribution of “practical cultural nationality” allows white citizens to feel that their culture is superior and thus are the key holders of what it means to be Australian. Due to the holding of such power there is a fixed position of the dominant group to exclude racialized citizens including Aboriginals. Moreover, similarities can be witnessed when we examine past colonial experiences. For example, when France colonized Algeria it did not give Muslims French citizenship. As addressed by Paul A. Silverstein, in *Kabyle Immigrant Politics and Racialized Citizenship in France* (2008), denying Muslims citizenship on the basis of their religion—despite the fact that Algeria was “administratively assimilated” with France—illuminates the power dynamics between the privileged group and the disenfranchised (Silverstein, 2008, pp.
Silverstein acknowledges that even when individuals of Muslim descent or immigrants become French, by citizenship, they are given a hyphenated title, one that makes them secondary citizens. He cautions that this further pushes racialized citizens away from political engagement and further progresses institutional racism and discrimination (p.40).

The patterns that can be witnessed in Western nation-states, including but not limited to the examples I have presented in the UK, Canada, Australia and France, are significantly important to acknowledge as a theoretical framework behind this paper. The evidence presented through scholarship on racialized citizenship, suggests that if we are to examine counter-terrorism efforts, such as surveillance practices, while also acknowledging the importance of citizens civil liberties, we must recognize the effects these practices will have on groups who already susceptible to being marginalized within their own home country. If Islamophobia and xenophobia continue to exist in Western nation-states, there will only be a further separation of identities within the state that will leave certain groups feeling under attack, or paranoid of being attacked. This constant fear of being targeted does not create a healthy environment for anyone living within the country. It can even create further hostilities and problems due to individuals feeling like they never belong. If countries such as Canada wish to be presented as multicultural and inclusive, there needs to be a serious discussion on the practices of surveillance and the civil liberties of citizens.
PART I: METHODOLOGY
EXPERIENCES OF RACIALIZED CITIZENS FROM THE USA, UK and CANADA

Research on Western national security post 9/11 has emerged as a prevalent area of study within security scholarship (Grayling 2010; Athedide 2009; Poynting, P. and Perry, B. (2007). As I have already acknowledged and established, discourses on Islamophobia and other similar subjects such as xenophobia, have been greatly analyzed and critiqued by academics (Razack 2008, 2005, 2002; Mastnak 2010; Silverstein 2008). Similarly, research on counter-terrorism efforts and security studies has become significant within the academic community (Kremer 2014; Beyer and Bauer 2009; Jarvis and Lister 2010). However, research on the feelings of citizens—specifically racialized citizens—when addressing both civil liberties and counter-terrorism, has attracted much less attention in the wake of the war of terror and its aftermath.

Though arguably Islamophobia can be used as a tool to study the prevalence of discrimination that Muslims may experience in Western countries, this leaves out other minority citizens and their feelings towards national security and such tools like counter-terrorism mechanisms. Moreover, if we solely focus on Islamophobia or counter-terrorism as individual concepts, we fail to recognize how certain connections have significantly influenced various policies and legislations. For example, it is important to discover other links between racialized citizens and counter terrorism efforts that have manifested in Western countries.

A link between national security and civil liberties that has been pointed out by some scholars who have suggested that in order to protect national security, there is a need to compromise civil liberties (Kremer 2014; Grayling 2010). This link particularly
affects the lives of racialized citizens (including Muslims), who may feel that their civil liberties are being undermined in order to fulfil what the majority, or those in authority, deem the appropriate response. If this is the case, these same citizens may feel a sense of mistrust and anxiety from their own governments, while at the same time already facing the challenges of being racialized citizens.

The research that I have presented comes from three studies in the Western nation-states of the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. The first study is a 2004 U.S. quantitative research study that used surveys to ask citizens how they felt on compromising their civil liberties to combat terrorism. The second study is a 2013 qualitative study from the U.K that used focus groups and interviews of racialized citizens. The purpose of the study was to examine how these individuals felt under certain counter-terrorism practices and the environment. The final study is a 2011 Canadian qualitative study that too used interviews to examine how Muslims felt about their Canadian citizenship in a post 9/11 society. It is with these studies that I hope to illustrate how citizens (including non-racialized citizens), are not ready to give up their civil liberties to a big brother state.

Moreover, it is my intention to identify the gap in research that fails to address the paranoia racialized individuals may feel from certain counter-terrorism practices, that further disenfranchises them as already second-class citizens. I believe that more research is needed to examine the commonalities and nuances of these experiences in local, national and supranational levels.

i. U.S. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY STUDY, 2004
In an American study conducted by Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver (2004) from Michigan State University, the authors examined public opinion on compromising civil liberties for the security of the state via telephone interview surveys. The “Civil Liberties Survey” conducted for the authors’ paper, “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America” (2004), used data “from a national random-digit-dialling telephone survey of persons 18 years of age and older” (Davis and Silver, 2004, p.32). The survey was conducted between November 14\textsuperscript{th} 2001 and January 15\textsuperscript{th} 2002, following the aftermath of 9/11. The authors interviewed over 1448 respondents citing that their completion rate was 52.3% with a refusal rate of 19.0% (p.32). The survey data was “weighted to be representative of the adult population of the United States” (p.32). The “Civil Liberties Survey” found as expected by the authors, “American citizens are more in favour of protecting civil liberties over personal security in the abstract than in actual situations. In response to a general question of giving up some civil liberties in order to curb terrorism in the U.S, 55% favoured protecting civil liberties” (Davis and Silver 2004, p. 33).

The authors asked “trade-off” questions, such as trading off freedom of speech for protecting security, and illustrated that a majority of 65% individuals did not wish to “trade-off” their rights. The authors note that between races (whites, blacks, Hispanics) and political parties (Democrats and Republicans) there is a wide variety of responses. For example, the authors cite that as a whole, African Americans are more concerned with social trust, whereas Hispanics are more concerned with individual trust (p.37). The authors also found that Republicans were more in favour of protecting national security than Democrats. These differences in attitudes, gives a more realistic perspective on different views within the U.S.
Similarly, the authors also attempt to measure the trust in government with two survey questions. The researchers state, “to capture trust in the federal government in Washington, we use a four-point scale, in which “always” is scored as 4 and “none of the time” is scored as 1; we find an overall mean of 2.5 (s.d = .71)” (Davis and Silver 2004, p.35). The authors’ ability to use a rating scale illustrates that the survey may present some limitations, such as interviewer effects, demand characteristics, social desirability and privacy concerns. However, the ability of the researchers to use such a large sample size may generate more confidence for some readers. Davis and Silver (2004) conclude that,

“Americans are not ready to concede all of their civil liberties and personal freedoms in order to feel secure from the terrorist threat. While many citizens are willing to trade off civil liberties for greater security, Americans as whole adopt a moderate position” (p.41).

The research findings, in which men and women from 18-65 years of age, from various places across the country (including rural and city), who all had different educational backgrounds was a very exceptional research study sample size. The only critical limitations of the study were the authors’ failing to collect information on the income of the respondents. Again, this question itself poses some limitations in respect to privacy concerns but would be useful when examining how different socio-economic classes feel towards such policies. Another limitation may be that they study is over ten years old, however I believe this study successfully demonstrates that even at the height of combating terrorism (post-9/11), citizens are not willing to compromise their liberties. This indicates that such policies and political mechanisms to combat terrorism, when they conflict with civil liberties, is not only problematic but is unwanted.
However, though the research did focus on racialized citizens to an extent it did not fully elaborate on the sentiments racialized citizens may feel, especially those who are being continuously targeted as ‘suspects’. This gap can be useful when we take into consideration the treatment that some individuals may or may not feel within a securitized state.

As I have maintained throughout this paper, it is important to understand the dynamics of racialized citizens, for it is they who are targeted first, especially when we are exploring various counter-terrorism efforts. This does not mean that non-racialized persons are immune or not affected by these practices; however it does mean that the privileged of being viewed as a “good citizen” in a dominant white society, allows them to feel such pressures in a less direct way. These concerns can be observed in the next study from the U.K, where racialized citizens were interviewed.

**ii. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: U.K. STUDY, 2013**

The U.K. qualitative study conducted by Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (2013) titled, *Disconnected Citizenship? The Impacts of Anti-Terrorism Policy on Citizenship in the UK* (2013) examined the effects that anti-terrorism legislation has had on British citizens by analyzing anti-terrorism policy, using content analysis of various scholarship and utilizing qualitative research via focus-groups in 2010. Jarvis and Lister (2013) created focus groups designed around two primary variables: ethnicity (black, white or Asian) and geographical residence (metropolitan or non-metropolitan). The authors state that this comparative design facilitates an analysis of differences in perceptions and experiences among UK populations. From the two variables they produced six distinct
population groups for analysis. Conducting two focus groups for each resulted in a research design of twelve groups, with two ‘wild card’ groups.

In total, 81 individuals in London, Birmingham (as metro cities) and Oldham, Oldham, Swansea, Llanelli and Oxfordshire (as non-metro) were used in the study. The researchers used snowballing and enumeration methods to find their participants. They also used open-ended questions to maximize the extent to which individuals’ own attitudes came to fore. They were asked to discuss how they felt anti-terrorism measures impacted upon themselves, their communities and the UK more widely. This is similar to the study by Davis and Silver (2004), in which participants were asked on the phone how they felt at an individual level and at a larger societal level in relation to liberties and protecting national security. Even though the findings were similar, as the majority of participants in both studies agreed that civil liberties should be protected before security, Jarvis and Lister (2013) found a specific difference between whites and ethnic minorities.

The authors strategically cite that they wanted to see other ethnic minorities including blacks, because they felt scholarship has thus far only focused on Muslims and non-Muslims (in respect to anti-terror policies). I believe this research option was beneficial because it gives different perspectives and illustrates how attitudes differ between sub-groups. They found that white participants thought of security as a more abstract issue. Whereas minorities (including Muslims) felt a genuine threat to the compromise of their civil liberties, including their citizenship.
The study examined how individuals feel and provided a “human approach” to the way participants answered the questions. The following is an excerpt of one of the participants response to trusting the government:

“I mean, I would love to change things, which is probably why I have a passion for politics. But right now currently I would rather keep my mouth shut and not say anything that can be seen… like I tell my friends as well, don’t say anything that can… go against you. Because a lot of your phone calls, without you knowing is monitored by the MI5 anyway […] especially when you start saying things out of anger and emotion that can be about the system that we use to govern our ways of living, is turned against. So, if you say anything bad about it, it is literally monitored. (Asian Metropolitan 1, Female, Muslim)” (Jarvis and Lister 2013, P. 668)

This direct response reflects the sentiments that I have attempted to write throughout this paper. The female Muslim participant’s inherent fear is what I have addressed as paranoia. When Western governments legally allocate powers to intelligence agencies, it acts as a constant reminder of a racialized citizen’s vulnerability within the state. This constant fear perpetuates into a normalized way of thinking and living and subsequently allows the individual to self-surveil him or herself. Moreover, the idea of limiting one’s freedom of speech, is a reminder to the challenges presented when examining the civil liberties in Western nation-states. In this excerpt, the participant states that she would “rather keep [her] mouth shut”, due to the fear of being targeted. It is concerns such as these that Western nation-states should consider when creating counter-terrorism mechanisms, such as surveillance.

Another direct quote from a research participant shows that the fear of being watched is a constant reality in the day-to-day life of the individual:

“I’m quite wary about an attack on my freedom or individual liberty, in the sense that I might walk down the street one minute, a black van might just come and I am taken away, whisked away by MI5 or MI6 […] I have to sort of fear what I
say because of the possible repercussions (Asian Metropolitan 1, Male, Muslim)” (p. 667).

Moreover, the study shows how other racialized persons, who are non-Muslims, feel a sense of anxiety when being asked about their belonging as a citizen. One black female participant stated:

“So yes, we are, sort of, having the after effects of... because the fact people are still stopped and searched, it increases the racism. It increases the fact that... I may not be Muslim, but people, sort of, like, think that... somehow I’ve got something to do with it. So it makes our lives, as individuals, even more difficult (Black Non-Metropolitan 1, Female)” (p.667).

The research findings illustrate that Muslims face a disconnect from their citizenship in the U.K., due to the fact that they are expected to live to the certain standards that the dominant society has argued is appropriate and acceptable, such as condemning terrorist attacks publically. This disconnection is a manifestation of the various challenges racialized citizens must confront in their day-to-day lives. They must be a “good Muslim” and assimilate to what is accepted by society; otherwise they will automatically be labeled as “bad Muslims” (Razack, 2008; Mamdani 2004). An excerpt from the research, made by a participant, summarizes this reality well. The participant states,

“[E]ven when, you know, you come out against terrorism, you’re not doing it because you’re opposed to terrorism but you did it to safeguard your own position. So you’re stuck in this catch 22 and even if you condemn it you’re still, you know, viewed with suspicion (Asian non-metropolitan 2, female, Muslim)” (p. 668)

Both studies presented thus far did not directly address the fear or paranoia that racialized individuals experience in their day-to-day lives, but rather focused on this fear as an element to a bigger picture. However, I believe that there is a unique importance in
understanding how and why this paranoia is perpetuated and as such, there should be more scholarly work that examines local, national and supranational commonalities and nuances of the experiences racialized citizens have with surveillance operations in a post-9/11 Era. I believe that both research studies fail to pay sufficient attention to the notion that creating a Panoptic system of government, racialized citizens feel like they are constantly being watched and in turn begin to watch themselves. Self-surveillance creates this constant mentality of mistrust and insecurity. It is also important to understand how the citizenship of an individual does not universally protect them, though in theory it should. Some members (mainly those who face systemic barriers such as racialized individuals and Aboriginals) already face the obstacle of being accepted as citizens even when they are legally entitled to such status. The third study I present addresses these relevant issues.

In her dissertation titled, “Unequal Citizenship: Being Muslim and Canadian in the Post 9/11 Era” (2011), Baljit Nagra addresses the issues racialized Muslim citizens face in their day-to-day lives in Canada. She indicates that her research shows that the “citizenship rights of Canadian Muslims may be undermined because they do not have access to allegiance and nationality, important facets of citizenship” (p.ii). Her research also finds,

“Young Canadian Muslims are racialized and othered through increasingly stereotypical conceptions about their gender identities. Muslim men are perceived as barbaric and dangerous and Muslim women are imagined as passive and oppressed by their communities. As a result of these dominant conceptions, in their struggle against racism, young Canadian Muslims have to invest a great deal of time establishing themselves as thinking, rational, educated and peaceful persons” (p.ii).
Finally Nagra finds that because of the challenges many young Muslim Canadians face in their everyday lives, they are asserting their Muslim identities. She argues that this is a coping mechanism they use to face the marginalization from society. She coins the term ‘reactive identity formation’, that she argues is when ethnic communities strengthen their ethnic identity due to challenges of being marginalized.

In her research study, Nagra retrieved qualitative data from 50 in-depth interviews with 24 Muslim men and 26 Muslim women, between the ages of 18 and 31 between 2005 and 2008. Her participants were 82% Canadian citizens with 40% being born in Canada and 42% being naturalized citizens. The interviews were conducted in the Canadian metropolitan cities of Toronto and Vancouver. The author found participants by reaching out to individuals she was connected with and by visiting various Muslim student organizations. She also heavily relied on snowball sampling. The author notes that the majority of participants are well-educated Muslims, holding or studying for post-secondary education. She also recognizes that because of this privilege, many of the participants are from middle-class homes. She explains that her research sample is very diverse, stating:

“The sample reflects the diversity of Islam. The interviewees come from different national origins such as India, Pakistan, Fiji, the West Indies, Libya, Bangladesh, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and East Africa” (p.23).

One of the most frequent issues addressed in her research is the decision for young Muslim women to veil. Many young women who participated in the study, indicated that they only decided to veil after 9/11 as a way of holding on to their culture. However, the backlash they receive by the dominant society is not only constant but constructs this image of a Muslim women who is oppressed by Muslim men, when in fact it was their
choice to cover—as they did not cover before. One participant summarizes the experience very well:

“I have seen the opposite effect. Girls were being extra religious and wearing proper traditional clothes after 9/11. They were being more so religious than before. You would think they would do the opposite because they did not want to be discriminated against, but they became more religious. But I don't know why”

(p.111)

Another constant theme is young Muslim men feel they are under constant surveillance, Nagra writes,

“...I find that many young Muslims recall living in a hostile environment in the post 9/11 era in Canada. They perceive this harassment as challenging their citizenship as Canadians. Their interactions with state surveillances practices and mainstream Canadian society suggest to them that they are seen as potential threats, not loyal Canadian citizens. They feel their safety and security is jeopardized, they find they are victimized in public spaces, they suffer a loss of religious freedom, and their economic security is compromised. They report increased state surveillance that directly targets their Muslim identity, not only at airports and borders, but in their daily lives, suggesting to them that Canadian citizenship may not hold the same value for them as for others”

(p. 3)

She directly quotes a young Muslim woman who states,

“Post-9/11 my dad was very concerned. For the longest while, we wouldn’t talk on the phone about anything related to 9/11. We’d talk in person. Like, he was insistent that we be careful of our e-mails, MSN messages, anything internet-related just in case, because there was this rumour that CSIS was tapping all Muslim phone lines. I don’t know how much of that is true, and there’s scare tactics involved in that as well. But I know, like, for the Toronto 18 that was a real case, and a lot of their families and friends’ phones were tapped”

(p.107)

The fear of being watched while having to filter what an individual thinks in a free society is a constant theme for racialized persons, especially Muslims in a post 9/11 world. The young woman specifically states, “I don’t know how much of that is true”.

This quote validates the notion that racialized citizens, whether they are aware of it or not, have a constant paranoia that becomes entrenched in their lives. Such statements
clearly indicate the fear and distress that Western governments have embedded in the minds of many racialized citizens. It is these experiences that challenge Western nations’ claims as morally superior to those states that they deems to violate human rights. If Western nation-states wish to critique the ideologies or practices of alleged oppressive countries and their treatment of their citizens, they must lead by example.

The three studies presented illustrate the realities many racialized citizens face in their every day lives in countries such as the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. The studies have also addressed the issue of counter-terrorism through various practices and the struggles of compromising citizens’ civil liberties. Thus far I have outlined various terminologies, crafted a framework built on radicalized citizenship and have used three academic studies to illustrate the realities racialized citizens face in Western nation-states when it comes to their civil liberties and counter-terrorism mechanisms. The following sections of this paper will summarize why all these components are important and also very real. In Part IV, I will briefly outline three government acts that have been presented in Western countries. These acts include, the U.S. Patriot Act (2001), the U.K’s CONTEST strategy (2011) and Canada’s Bill C-51 (2015). All these legislations have been highly controversial but have also been supported by many.
PART V: VARIOUS MEASURES
Patriot Act, Contest, Bill C-51

The material that I have presented thus far has examined many abstract concepts. I have purposely acknowledged how Western governments do not understand nor can predict how the actions the commit today will influence the lives of many in the future. These theoretical concerns, rooted from genuine alarm (especially from racialized citizens) can often be challenged as being too abstract. For example, though the process of racialized citizenship may seem very real for racialized individuals, there is a possibility for non-racialized persons to not recognize the lived realities of these people because they never have to face anything similar in nature. Similarly, the idea of self-surveillance, which I have attempted to illustrate and defend as paranoia, can be interpreted as solely theoretical, despite the qualitative evidence presented. It is for this reason that I wish to address the true reality of such practices—the aftermath if you will—anti-terror legislations.

These acts provide a material basis to support the experiences and suspicions of racialized citizens. It is these same acts which have been highly controversial and contested by civil liberty groups and advocates, along with human rights groups (Graying, 2010, p. 58). These legislations are not only evident in specific Western nation-states, but have been adopted almost universally in Western countries such as the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and many more countries. The first anti-terror measure that I will address is the 2001 U.S. Patriot Act, I will then follow by briefly outlining the U.K.’s 2011 CONTEST strategy, which is a third version of the original 2003 legislation. Finally I will address Canada’s 2015 controversial Bill C-51. Though I will not go in-depth with any of these legislations, I simply wish to give readers an idea of why it is
important to understand the theoretical framework of racialized citizenship and how these measures only further perpetuate paranoia for individuals who already feel they do not fully belong—in spite of being citizens.

**i. PATRIOT ACT, 2001**

In 2001, President of the U.S., George W. Bush declared that there was a *war on terrorism* (Duffy, 2005). Following the events of 9/11, Bush decided to take what his administration felt was the next appropriate step in combating terrorism, the Patriot Act of 2001 (Grayling, 2010). PATRIOT stands for: Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. The act gave more powers to various American security services and law enforcement agencies. As outlined by Grayling 2010,

“It licensed breaking into email and telephone communications and searching individuals’ personal financial and medical (and library borrowing!) records without a warrant, and without informing suspects that they were being investigated. It permitted wider intelligence-gathering activities abroad, gave summary powers to police and immigration officials to detain individuals indefinitely and deport them. It gave the US Treasury powers to examine and regulate a wider range of financial transactions, and redefined ‘terrorism’ to include many more activities” (p.57-58).

The Patriot Act was a precedent for many other acts that would follow in the U.S. and around the world. In the U.S., the Protect America Act of 2008, that increased measures internationally, such as “collecting international communications without court order” (p.59). The Patriot Act generated constitutional court challenges. As mentioned by Grayling (2010),

“The American Civil Liberties Union took the FBI to court for conducting ‘fishing expeditions’—looking through personal health, financial and business records of tens of thousands of individuals unaware that they were under scrutiny, in the hope that something suspicious might appear—and it won the case,
establishing that such ‘fishing expeditions’ using the Patriot Act violated the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution” (p.58).

The issue of ‘fishing expeditions’ or any other measure of counter-terrorism tools used, including surveillance, under the Patriot Act can clearly be problematic for ‘suspect groups’, especially Muslims and other racialized citizens. It is these legal measures that are a concern for individuals who wish to guard their civil liberties. These measures have also been practiced in many other Western governments, including the UK and it’s CONTEST strategy.

ii. CONTEST, 2011

In 2003, following in the steps of the U.S., the U.K., passed its CONTEST Strategy to combat terrorism. Similar to the Patriot Act, CONTEST has produced controversy and has been challenged in the courts, with some of its provisions being repealed. These initiatives allocated various powers to governments such as the power of detention without charge for foreign nationals and increased pre-charge detention periods (Jarvis and Lister, 2013, p. 656)

The legal challenges that have arisen since the initial CONTEST Strategy in 2003 and its revisions is a clear indication of the flaws that such policies have. For Grayling (2010) these kinds of policies become dangerous because for him it is just the beginning. When do we begin to differentiate what is in the parameters of counter-terrorism and what is not? How do we know that tools such as collecting biometric data will be collected in a National Identity Register, will actually be used for combating terrorist activities and not to target certain groups or even be sold to private companies? These concerns should be discussed amongst policy advisors and politicians alike if we are to
continue to wave our ‘free-democratic-society’ flag. Canada, a country with a reputation of being multicultural and accepting, is no exception to these practices, with Bill C-51, which has recently become part of the Canadian law.

iii. BILL C-51, 2015

In June 2015, Bill-C-51 received Royal Assent making it part of Canadian law. Like the other measures indicated above, C-51 gives Canadian government officials more powers to counter terrorism. One of the concerns with the Bill is that it impacts the right to free speech. For example,

“Encouraging or promoting others to carry out terrorist acts becomes its own criminal offence under the Criminal Code. Individuals can be found guilty regardless of whether the terrorist act they are promoting is carried out. According to the bill it could land someone up to five years in prison (Watters, 2015).

These acts should be a concern for individuals who wish to express their beliefs in a free society. If we are to be limited of expression and speech, we are only following in the direction of non-democratic nation-states, which the Western governments have continuously criticized. It is our liberties that distinguish us as free and liberal and we should be hesitant to give them up so quickly. By legally giving governments various powers to further disenfranchise ‘suspect’ groups (mainly racialized citizens) we are promoting an unequal and discriminatory state by ‘othering’ certain groups. When we continue to ‘other’ groups they begin to internalize and isolate themselves from mainstream society, which can foster many unintended consequences. For example, this can make individuals feel more ‘at home’ with extremists abroad, then they feel in their own home countries. Similarly, the West’s treatment of racialized groups can be used as propaganda to recruit foreign Western fighters. It is these unintended consequences that
we must remain concerned about, while also being conscious about the intended consequences such as detention.

Bill C-51 also gives new powers to Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). The intelligence agency under C-51 is now able to not only collect information from individuals and groups they may feel are a threat, but can now disrupt suspected terrorists pots. “If they have reasonable grounds to think a security threat exists, CSIS can now interfere with the travel plans and bank transactions of suspected terrorists. CSIS also has the power to disrupt radical websites and Twitter accounts” (Watters, 2015).

As I have suggested, these powers are not fully understood yet. We cannot predict how our actions today will influence tomorrow. However, we must be aware of the unintended consequences and not allow governments to hold complete power over citizens. The purpose of including these various acts, the Patriot Act, CONTEST and Bill C-51 was to illustrate that indeed, these issues are very real and have continued to be real nearly 14 years. Even though these acts have been challenged in courts, they continue to emerge in Western governments and they continue to generate controversy. It is for this reason that I have attempted to demonstrate the relation between citizenship, civil liberties and counter-terrorism efforts.
PART VI: CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper I have attempted to bring awareness to the need for more scholarly work in identifying the fear and paranoia that racialized citizens feel in their day-to-day lives through more local, national and supranational research studies. Though the data I have presented from three research studies provides readers with a very realistic and relevant dimension that racialized citizens face in Western governments, they do not focus on what I have referred to as paranoia—the constant reminder of being a target. All three studies that I have presented demonstrate that citizens are not willing to give up their civil liberties but when faced with being made targets, they would rather remain demure and blend in with the dominant society. This constant anxiety, which has become normalized through legal measurements including the United States of America’s Patriot Act, the U.K.’s CONTEST strategy and Canada’s Bill C-51, has compromised the civil liberties of those living in the West.

I have argued that there is reason to assume that when we create legitimate practices that target individuals who already feel that they are being othered, we are only pushing these individuals further away. In a way, we are making them feel like they are a threat. For me, this is very alarming. We do not understand the unintended consequences our actions may have in the future and we should keep this into consideration before we create legal measures to combat what we feel is a threat to our liberty. We must remain mindful that what we do today will continue to follow us in the future, as argued by David Prieto (2009),

“Counterterrorism policies and programs that deviate from a commitment to protecting individual liberties harm U.S. foreign policy and national security: they can reduce the legitimacy of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, erode the trust of allies and the American public in U.S. government actions, hamper cooperation and support
from American allies, alienate moderate Islamic groups that the United States has an interest in cultivating, and provide powerful propaganda for extremists to radicalize new followers and recruit terrorist operatives” (p.6)

It is for this reason that Prieto states that counter-terrorism practices can only best be achieved when they take into consideration civil liberties. It is this same caution that I advise those who are involved with such measures to consider. We must recognize the paranoia that has been created with rapid technology and the practices I have continuously addressed throughout this paper. It is only when we recognize this gap that we can ensure that we do not further push individuals to be isolated and face the consequences in the unforeseen future.

At the beginning of this paper I argued that I would attempt to illustrate how various counter-terrorism procedures have fostered the development of paranoia for certain members of society, mainly those who are racialized. By presenting informative key terms, a theoretical framework, three Western nation-state studies along with acknowledging various legal tools used post 9/11, it is my hope to continue to add to discussion in academia on the relevant connected themes of citizenship, civil liberties and counter-terrorism.
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This paper aims at establishing a connection between counter-terrorism, civil liberties and citizenship with the intent of expanding the already existing literature on citizens’ sentiments towards counter-terrorism measures. While presenting data from various research studies from Western nation-states, it is my intention to bring attention to the feelings of racialized citizens as primary targets of the presented counter-terror tools. I will argue that there is reason to assume that such counter-terrorism policies presented foster the development of what I refer to as paranoia for racialized citizens.